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INTRODUCTION 
Border tax adjustments (BTAs) may be able to alleviate concerns of 
reduced competitiveness for countries introducing environmental taxes and 
standards, while limiting the risk of companies relocating to developing 
countries to exploit lax environmental regimes—known as leakage. 1 
However, the ability of industrialized nations to offer developing countries 
special trade privileges for developmental purposes, including border tariff 
exemptions on exported goods, provides what is referred to in this article as 
a “leakage loophole.” This scheme allows relocating companies to produce 
goods in developing countries at high environmental cost and sell them in 
the industrialized country they relocated from with no adjustment at the 
border at a potentially lower cost than domestically produced goods which 
have internalized their negative environmental externalities. 
This article considers tax methods that counter the ability of such trade 
privileges benefitting those wishing to relocate and exploit them as to 
prevent leakage and ensure any concessions are only available for whom 
they are intended. In light of current academic debate, this article uses the 
“best available technology” (BAT) standard to exemplify the potential 
grounds for adjustment exemption. Further, it considers the uses of border 
tax adjustments for any legitimate environmental goal, not simply for 
carbon emissions. 
This article is divided as follows, with the presumption that this article 
applies where World Trade Organization (WTO) law is prevalent. Part I 
provides a background on unilateral environmental objectives. Part II 
summarizes reasons why nations may take unilateral action for 
environmental purposes and how it may impact other nations. Part III 
introduces the concept of border tax adjustments as a potential trade-neutral 
environmental measure. Part IV identifies that some environmental taxes 
may aim to alter the production methods used to make a good instead of 
concentrating solely upon the environmental qualities of the final product. 
Part V introduces the notion that any tax incentives used to alter production 
methods could be dependent upon a producer using the BAT. Part VI 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 
65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 422 (2005) (discussing, in terms of carbon, how developing countries requiring 
revenue and employment may be willing to allow relocating companies to operate with little 
environmental supervision). 
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explains how nations may withhold the introduction of domestic 
environmental taxes if they believe it would place their industry at a 
competitive disadvantage internationally. 
Part VII explains that some developing countries’ exported goods are 
exempted from border tariffs upon import into industrialized countries as a 
form of development aid and also attempts to identify the perceived 
intended beneficiaries of this aid. Part VII also examines how this 
exemption offers multi-national enterprises the opportunity to register in 
developing countries in order to exploit the concession, which is in 
contradiction of the exemption’s intended purpose. Part VIII proposes and 
critically assesses a number of original solutions to solve this real problem. 
Finally, this article summarizes and concludes by identifying the most 
effective solution. 
I. BACKGROUND: UNILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
The problem of multi-source locations of negative environmental 
externalities could most effectively be overcome with coordinated global 
action. However, political limitations prohibit such a response in the short 
term; 2  the pre-Copenhagen negotiations demonstrated that even with a 
general consensus on an environmental problem, agreement on a 
multilateral response may prove impossible. The difficulty of a multilateral 
response is heightened when there are disputes as to the extent of 
contributions of a source to a problem,3 to those who ought to bear the 
burden of a problem,4 to the most effective legal tools of dealing with a 
problem,5 or as to the scientific existence of a problem itself.6 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 696–97 (1999) (explaining that such a response would require “universal or 
nearly universal coverage of present and potential source locations”); see also Janet E. Milne, New 
Instruments on Old Turf: The Institutional Challenges of Environmental Taxation, in V CRITICAL ISSUES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 142 (Nathalie 
Chalifour et al. eds., 2008). 
 3. Simon Dresner et al., A History and Social Responses to Environmental Tax Reform in the 
United Kingdom, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 930, 933 (2006); Dale Jamieson, Uncertainty and Risk Assessment: 
Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 35, 36–41 
(1996). 
 4. The “Polluter-Pays” principle is exemplified within the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, which developed a broad understanding of the parties responsible for payment. Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992). For a discussion of who comprises 
that tax base and whether such parties can be efficiently targeted, see generally MARIE-LOUISE 
BEMELMANS-VIDEC ET AL., CARROTS, STICKS & SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS & THEIR 
EVALUATION (1998); WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL REFORM: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND 
HOW TO ACHIEVE IT 22 (2005), available at 
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In the absence of coordinated global action, there may be either no 
international agreement on how to deal with an environmental problem or a 
multilateral agreement without global coverage. 7  Some countries may 
believe that action to protect the environment cannot be postponed pending 
international consensus and undertake unilateral trade measures, 8 while 
                                                                                                                 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETENVIRONMENT/Publications/20712869/EnvFiscalRef
orm.pdf (discussing environmental fiscal reform and the creation of a new tax base); Roberta Mann, 
Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1135, 1206–15 (2002) 
(discussing environmental taxes as a method to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); Paul R. McDaniel, 
Taxing Consumption Only: Identifying the Issues, 47 TAX EXECUTIVE 442, 442 (1995); R.K. Turner et 
al., Green Taxes, Waste Management and Political Economy, 53 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 120, 130–31 (1998) 
(discussing the benefits of income tax versus consumer tax). 
 5. Much of the debate began with arguments concerning whether government intervention is 
appropriate, then considered whether regulation or Pigouvian taxes were the most efficient interventions. 
See generally STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG, THE MYTH OF SOCIAL COST 67–68 (1978) (discussing the validity 
of the economic theory of social cost); JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT 
INTEREST AND MONEY (1936) (discussing the shortcomings of laissez-faire economics); ARTHUR C. 
PIGUO, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1950) (discussing state regulation of the free market); 
Ping Chen, Complexity of Transaction Costs and Evolution of Corporate Governance, 76 KYOTO ECON. 
REV. 139, 146–47 (2007) (discussing China’s experience in corporate governance); Steven N. S. Cheung, 
The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 11–13 (1973) (discussing the 
perils of policy-making); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28 (1960) 
(discussing society’s need to account for social costs); Andrew Halpin, Disproving the Coase Theorem?, 
23 ECON. PHIL., 321, 321–22 (2007) (discussing the proper application of the Coase Theorem); J. E. 
Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54, 58 (1952) 
(discussing appropriate tax levels to benefit private industry competition). Within those camps lie further 
debates about the most efficient form of each response, such as the existence of a revenue recycling 
double dividend. See generally Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: 
A Reader’s Guide, 2 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 157, 157 (1995) (discussing substituting revenue-neutral 
environmental taxes for income taxes); Wallace E. Oates, Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment 
and Improve the Tax System at the Same Time?, 61 S. ECON. J. 915, 921 (1995). How to correctly value 
the environment is the subject of further debate. See Dieter Helm & David Pearce, Assessment: 
Economic Policy Towards the Environment, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 1, 2 (1990) (discussing the 
complexities of creating environmental policies); see generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 48–49 (2007) (discussing the notion of environmental 
stewardship in global ethical systems). Milne explains the complexity of the various options such as 
cap-and-trade policies and carbon taxes. Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context 
for the Future, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–23 (2008), available at 
http://www.vjel.org/journal/pdf/VJEL10073.pdf. 
 6. Due to the complexity of this debate, the debate can only meaningfully be advanced by 
interdisciplinary research. As such, it is rational to accept as a starting point the current understandings 
of environmental risk. John Grummer, Climate Change: Global Threat, Global Challenge, 15 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 156, 156 (2000) (discussing the causes and consequences of global environmental 
damage). 
 7. See, e.g., Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (noting 
the United States’ omission to ratify the Kyoto Protocol). 
 8. Tania Voon, Sizing up the WTO: Trade-Environment Conflict and the Kyoto Protocol, 10 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 71, 78 (2000), available at 
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others may attempt to incentivize ratification of a treaty by threatening the 
same to non-cooperating parties.9 While parties with such views have a 
choice of measures to take nationally to achieve unilateral or international 
environmental objectives, there is a fear amongst those taking such action 
that their economy will be disadvantaged by imposing higher costs on 
domestic producers.10 Countries introducing internal environmental taxes, 
regulations, or cap-and-trade schemes 11  will be concerned that national 
industries may suffer a loss of competitiveness against similar foreign 
goods produced without internalizing negative environmental externalities 
or protecting the environment. 
II. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
Border tax adjustments are one possible trade measure to reduce the 
risk of a market being over-exposed to cheaper, “pollution-intensive 
imports.” 12  A border tax adjustment is a fiscal measure adopting the 
“destination principle,” which allows: 
[E]xported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax 
charged in the exporting country in respect of similar 
domestic products sold to consumers on the home market 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol101/Voon.pdf; see also Ian Sheldon, Climate Policy 
and Border Tax Adjustments: Some New Wine Mixed with Old Wine in New Green Bottles?, 11 Esty 
Centre J. Int’l L. & Trade Pol’y 253 (2010), available at http://www.esteycentre.ca 
/journal/j_pdfs/sheldon11-1.pdf) (discussing how the possibility of non-agreement on the Copenhagen 
Protocol would have lead to countries pursuing differing policies to tackle climate change, resulting in 
no international price of carbon). 
 9. Christopher L. Weber & Glen P. Peters, Climate Change Policy and International Trade: 
Policy Considerations in the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 432, 432–39 (2009) (discussing whether carbon 
tariffs are the best way to leverage international trade against climate change). 
 10. For instance, French President Sarkozy has called for BTAs to represent carbon on imports 
into the European Union to create a fair playing field. Sachin Parashar, France Wants a ‘Carbon Tax’ on 
EU Imports, TIMES INDIA (Nov. 30, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/France-
wants-a-carbon-tax-on-EU-imports/articleshow/5282146.cms. 
 11. “Cap-and-trade” schemes refer to schemes where an authority limits the total permissible 
quantity of a pollutant. The authority gives allowances to companies specifying the extent to which they 
may emit the pollutant. Companies not using their allowances may sell them to companies needing more, 
thereby creating a value for the pollutant. For example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
operates such a trading system for CO2 emissions. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 
32 (EC) (establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the community). 
 12. “Pollution-intensive imports” refers to goods produced using environmental standards 
falling below, and causing more negative environmental externalities than, similar goods produced in an 
importing country. In this respect, the term “carbon-intensive” is used to demonstrate a potential shift in 
consumption. BEN LOCKWOOD & JOHN WHALLEY, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, POLICY 
BRIEF NO. 4: CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 2 (2008). 
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and which enable imported products sold to consumers to 
be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the 
importing country in respect of similar domestic products.13 
Therefore, both exports and imports may be adjusted. In addition to 
being used to reflect internal taxes, it is also theoretically possible for a 
border tax adjustment to reflect the internal producer’s non-tax costs 
imposed by regulation or cap-and-trade policies. Their rationale and legality 
under WTO law are subjects of much study, which is not repeated here.14 
This article operates on the view that these adjustments are considered legal 
under specific circumstances, with the caveat that there remains uncertainty 
in the definitive translation of the relevant international rules.15 The basis of 
the WTO rules on border tax adjustments is that their legitimate purpose is 
not to limit imports per se, but to limit imports of goods produced using 
                                                                                                                 
 13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, 
¶ 4, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf 
[hereinafter GATT Working Party]. 
 14. See generally, Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the 
WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L L. 575, 591 (2008) (identifying the 
legal and political dynamics of standards and recognition and finding good prospects for these new non-
state governance systems); Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments Under GATT 
and EC Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 7 (1994) 
(discussing GATT and ECU rules); Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax 
Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395, 395 (2004) (discussing the use of border tax 
adjustments and implications for WTO Members); Francesco Sindico, The EU and Carbon Leakage: 
How to Reconcile Border Adjustments with the WTO?, 17 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 328, 328 
(2008) (discussing whether cap-and-trade could be compatible with the law of the WTO). 
 15. For examinations of the circumstances under which border tax adjustments are considered 
legitimate, see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 103–09 
(2009) (discussing whether participation in a cap-and-trade system could “be comparable to a 
carbon/energy tax for the purpose of introducing border adjustments”); Bradly F. Condon, Climate 
Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 898–99 (2009) (“In addition to 
the foregoing policy alternatives, countries may choose to apply tariffs or border taxes that discriminate 
between different products based on differences in national climate change policies or differences in the 
carbon footprints of products, or may provide direct subsidies to domestic producers. The GATT 
consistency of such border tax adjustments is unclear.”); Roland Ismer & Karstin Neuhoff, Border Tax 
Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. L. ECON. 137, 137 (2007) 
(discussing leakage caused by CO2 emission limitations); Stephanie Switzer, International Trade Law 
and the Environment: Designing a Legal Framework to Curtail the Import of Unsustainably Produced 
Biofuels, 6 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 30, 30 (2007) (discussing how countries may regulate 
unsustainably produced biofuels that is consistent with international trade rules); Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon 
Tarriffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 749, 749 (2009) 
(examining the legality of cap-and-trade programs under WTO law); John Kemp, Trade Law No Block 
to Carbon Tariffs, CARBON OFFSETS DAILY (June 26, 2009), http://www.carbonoffsetsdaily.com/uk-
carbonmarketnews/trade-law-no-block-to-carbon-tariffs-john-kemp-9280.htm (“Nothing in international 
trade law would prevent countries that introduce carbon taxes or cap-and-trade programmes from 
supplementing them with excise duties, tariffs or other measures on imports from countries that don’t.”). 
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standards below those of the importing country so as to provide a level 
playing field for national producers. 16  The net result of using these 
adjustments on trade should be neutral so as not to provide competitive 
advantages for the importing country.17 
For the purposes of this article, methods involving taxation are 
considered, as opposed to non-tax methods such as regulation.18 
III. PRODUCTION AND PROCESS METHODS 
Current thought has moved on from the idea that taxes should be placed 
solely upon environmentally unsound products, despite the relative 
administrative ease this allows. Taxing a final product based upon its 
expected negative externalities in order to internalize the environmental 
cost, however, fails to account for two concerns. 
The first concern is that a good may be domestically produced or 
imported, which is not itself environmentally damaging, but has been 
produced in an environmentally damaging manner. Since the end-use of 
such a good is not damaging, it would not ordinarily be taxed. Therefore, it 
may be necessary to consider the production and process methods (PPMs) 
used to produce a good.19 This can be done by taxing the PPM or taxing the 
end product to reflect that it was produced using a damaging PPM. The 
option to tax the end-use of the good remains as a separate tax from the tax 
based upon its PPMs. For example, a motor vehicle could be taxed to 
represent its pollution-intensive production method. However, this tax does 
not exclude the option for policymakers to charge a road user tax or a 
vehicle excise duty, which aim at different objectives such as incentivizing 
consumers to purchase vehicles with more efficient engines. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. For example, the Lieberman-Warner Senate Bill proposed action for countries not taking 
“comparable action” to America. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. 
§ 6001 (2008). 
 17. The net result may not be trade neutral depending upon market conditions. Steve 
McCorriston & Ian M. Sheldon, Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental 
Excise Taxes Under Imperfect Competition, 7 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 579, 591 (2005). 
 18. Competing arguments as to which are the most appropriate method are outside the ambit of 
this article. See HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, CONSULTATIONS & LEGISLATION: REVIEW OF THE 
TAXATION OF FOREIGN PROFITS (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consult_foreign_profits.htm#primaryContent (reviewing various consultations relating 
to the taxation of foreign profits). 
 19. John Whalley, Environmental Considerations in Tax Policy Design, 4 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 
111, 120 (1999) (discussing the suggested use of PPMs). 
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The second concern is the unsatisfactory result of considering only the 
qualities of a final good. Inputs into a final good may themselves be 
damaging or have been produced in an environmentally damaging manner. 
Component parts, known as “intermediary goods,” must be accounted for—
both intermediary goods which are imported and those which are used in 
the assembly of final goods before import.20 The PPMs of intermediary 
goods must also be identified; otherwise the full environmental attributes of 
a good will be ignored. For example, an imported car may be capable of 
outstanding fuel efficiency and its foreign production plant may assemble 
the vehicle in an energy efficient manner with all waste recycled. However, 
assessing the final product does not take into account that many 
intermediary goods may have been imported from a number of countries, 
some of which are using unsound PPMs that result in much pollution or 
environmental destruction.21 As such, intermediary goods should be taxed 
either individually or based upon their input into a final product. 
IV. BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY 
The difficulty in using PPMs as a basis for border tax adjustments is in 
determining what standard should be set for both domestic and imported 
goods. If the good is non-essential, a nation may decide it can do without it 
entirely and impose prohibitively high taxes to discourage production, 
reflected in border tax adjustments.22 If the good is essential, or if a nation 
decides to continue consuming a non-essential good, a nation may decide to 
implement a standard proposed by Ismer and Neuhoff, which is based upon 
the use of BAT.23 Ismer and Neuhoff’s proposal, which was made to limit 
leakage within an Emissions Trading Scheme24  (but which can also be 
applicable outside an emissions trading scheme), is that adjustments should 
be determined upon the basis of costs “corresponding to production with 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Intermediate goods are the subject of the majority of environmental excise taxes. 
McCorriston & Sheldon, supra note 17, at 591.  
 21. James M. Poterba & Julio M. Rotemberg, Environmental Taxes on Intermediate and Final 
Goods When Both Can Be Imported, 2 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 221, 222 (1995). 
 22. Whether such a restrictive measure would be legal under WTO law would depend upon it 
being regarded as “necessary to protect human, animal and plant life and health.” GATT, art. XX(b), Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. It would also depend on being “related to 
the protection of exhaustible natural resources.” GATT art. XX(g); see Alex Young, WTO and Integrated 
Product Policy (IPP): Trade Law Implications for the Use of Product Policy Instruments to Reduce the 
Risk of Exposure and Harm from Hazardous Substances in the Life Cycle of Personal Computers, 9 J. 
CLEANER PRODUCTION 297, 299 (2000) (discussing what would constitute “necessary” or “related to”). 
 23. Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 140. 
 24. Milne, supra note 5, at 3. 
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BAT rather than average technology.”25 This system has similarities with 
the United States’ proposed economic incentives for retailers selling “Best-
in-Class Appliances” to improve household efficiency, pursuant to the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.26 
If such technology is commercially available27 on the market and can be 
produced in the most efficient manner possible at any one time, producers 
will only be able to get border-tax-adjustment reimbursements if they use 
such technology. This could create demand for clean technology and 
provide a continuing incentive to innovate, which consequently may lead to 
a technology-driven response to environmental protection.28 Even Dowell, 
Hart, and Yeung, who argue against the risk of leakage, advocate innovative 
clean technology as being able to “achieve simultaneously world-class cost, 
quality, and environmental performance.”29 Though difficulties have been 
highlighted in requiring BAT, the BAT-Border-Tax-Adjustment method will 
be considered henceforth as a basis for exempting imports from these 
adjustments to exemplify the “leakage loophole” problem.30 
V. COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 
A potential disadvantage in countries with environmental taxes is that 
consumption may shift to pollution-intensive imports. Any tax situation 
which would allow nations to benefit from their omission to internalize 
environmental negativities could be both environmentally and economically 
counter-productive. If mobile taxpaying industries relocate to pollution 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 140. 
 26. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., § 214 (2009). 
 27. In practice, this means being available to buy on the open market, preferably from a range 
of competitive sellers as opposed to only being available in countries requiring its use. This could cause 
a country to exploit its ability to offer trade concessions in order to increase sales of its domestically 
produced technology. EMP.-INTENSIVE INVESTMENT BRANCH, INT’L LABOUR ORGANISATION, A 
GLOBAL PROGRAMME: INVESTING IN EMPLOYMENT FOR POVERTY REDUCTION AND LOCAL ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 12 (2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/download/eiip_prodoc.pdf [hereinafter A 
GLOBAL PROGRAMME]. 
 28. Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 155 (discussing the potential for BAT requirements to 
incite innovation). 
 29. Glen Dowell et al., Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy 
Market Value?, 46 MGMT. SCI. 1059, 1060 (2000). 
 30. See Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 14, at 591 (discussing the difficulties related to 
requiring BAT as a basis for border tax adjustments); Reinhard Quick & Christian Lau, Environmentally 
Motivated Tax Distinctions and WTO Law: The European Commission’s Green Paper on Integrated 
Product Policy in Light of ‘Like Product-’ and ‘PPM-’ Debates, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 419, 432–33 (2003) 
(same). 
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haven countries that offer little environmental regulation or taxation,31 then 
an environmentally conscious country could lose valuable industries and 
their receipts, while no overall environmental benefit would accrue, as the 
industry may continue, or even increase levels of pollution overseas.32 
Though some have suggested there is no benefit to be gained in practice 
for a country offering lax environmental regimes, 33  the economics are 
uncertain,34 and the prospect of a possible competitive disadvantage may 
itself discourage countries from utilizing eco-taxes. 35  In those countries 
introducing environmental taxation there is the risk that companies 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Foreign direct investment in developing countries was found to be “relative to the 
stringency of their environmental regulations.” Robert J. R. Elliott & Kenichi Shimamoto, Are ASEAN 
Countries Havens for Japanese Pollution-Intensive Industry?, 31 WORLD ECON. 236, 250 (2008) 
(“Pollution-intensive [foreign direct investment] will be drawn to countries with a high level of capital 
endowment relative to the stringency of their environmental regulations.”). 
 32. The actual consequences of leakage will differ depending upon the industry sector involved 
and may not apply to every sector; a study into the cement industry, for example, showed that there was 
a significant danger of leakage causing a rise in global emissions without border tax adjustments. 
DAMIEN DEMAILLY & PHILIPPE QUIRION, LEAKAGE FROM CLIMATE POLICIES AND BORDER TAX 
ADJUSTMENT: LESSONS FROM A GEOGRAPHIC MODEL OF THE CEMENT INDUSTRY (2006), available at 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/06/01/89/PDF/cement_industry.pdf. 
 33. Multi-national corporations adopting poor environmental standards of host countries do not 
increase their net worth and are generally valued financially lower than environmentally proactive 
companies. This happens for a number of reasons including not utilizing innovative technology, lower 
morale amongst workers disaffected by the environmental standing of their country, and negative 
reputation and costs caused by protesters. Dowell et al., supra note 29, at 160. Environmental standards 
in a country can actually increase innovation which would be beneficial to an economy. Michael E. 
Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness 
Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 98 (1995). There is also the prospect of the exchange rate 
mechanism operating to negate any advantage and the balance of payments cancelling out such benefits. 
See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman, Border Tax Adjustments: Do They Distort Trade?, 10 J. INT’L ECON. 117, 
118 (1980) (discussing comparative advantages); Harry G. Johnson & Mel Krauss, Border Taxes, Border 
Tax Adjustments, Comparative Advantage, and the Balance of Payments, 3 CANADIAN J. ECON. 595 
(1970) (same). 
 34. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) studies have found 
little evidence of environmental taxes causing competitive disadvantages for industry, though national 
concessions made to industry could distort their effectiveness. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED TAXES: ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 4 (2001), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/18/2674642.pdf (“To date, environmentally related taxes currently 
imposed by OECD countries have not been identified as causing significant reductions in the 
competitiveness of any sector.”). Competitiveness Effects of Environmental Tax Reforms (COMETR) is 
a European research project which studies the competitive effects of eco-taxes by sector. 
COMPETITIVENESS EFFECTS ENVTL. TAX REFORMS, http://www2.dmu.dk/cometr (last updated Mar. 26, 
2007). It has also been reported that in Canada between 2007 and 2008, GDP actually grew half a 
percent while emissions fell by nine percent among the top ten largest Canadian polluters. Canada’s 
Biggest Polluters Slash Emissions, CORP. KNIGHTS (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.corporateknights.ca/in-
the-press/72-press-releases/512-canadas-biggest-polluters-slash-emissions.html. 
 35. This is referred to as the “regulatory chill.” Ian Sheldon, Trade and Environmental Policy: 
A Race to the Bottom?, 57 J. AGRIC. ECON. 365, 368 (2006). 
2010] Towards Overcoming the Conflict 159 
exploiting pollution havens’ lax rules to produce at a low cost could then 
export goods back to the market they relocated from, in order to undercut 
goods produced under stricter environmental rules—a process known as 
“environmental dumping.” 36  Border tax adjustments would ordinarily 
operate to prevent such goods from entering a market at a low cost and thus 
remove the incentive for leakage. However, a potential problem arises when 
concessions are made for developing countries for developmental purposes 
and companies seek to exploit this.  
VI. EXEMPTION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The preventative ability of border tax adjustments in deterring 
environmental dumping and leakage is diluted by the perceived desirability 
of aiding developing countries via trade concessions. The purpose of these 
concessions will briefly be identified in the first subpart of this Part, 
together with a summary of how such concessions can be made under WTO 
law. This Part emphasizes that such concessions should be made only for 
developing countries, and not foreign private enterprises. Part VIII explains 
the potential for exploitation of the concession. 
A. Intended Beneficiaries of Trade Concessions 
The WTO employs a number of methods to alleviate poverty issues and 
aid development in developing countries, one of which is encouraging non-
reciprocal trade concessions with industrialized Countries. 37  By gaining 
access to markets in industrialized countries without paying import tariffs 
or other such charges, employment and trade opportunities can be created in 
developing countries that can encourage economic growth, thereby 
reducing poverty and dependence on direct foreign aid. This article accepts 
the proposition that trade concessions of this form are a beneficial approach. 
Normally, any preferential trade advantage offered to one nation must be 
offered to all nations pursuant to the “Most Favored Nation” principle, to 
prevent discrimination between different foreign producers.38 However, the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 15, at 103–09.  
 37. The principle requires that any trade advantage offered to one WTO member must be 
extended to all members to prevent discrimination. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 
93–94 (5th ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. 
 38. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, (Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
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Generalized System of Preferences permits non-reciprocal trade 
concessions between industrialized countries and developing countries, 
offered by the former on a more favorable basis than they offer other 
nations, if they are “designed to facilitate and promote the trade of 
developing countries.”39 This is known as the “Enabling Clause.”40 There is 
no requirement for such trade preferences to be offered to all developing 
countries; the special treatment can be granted to specific countries on the 
objective perception of their development needs.41  
The rationale for permitting trade concessions in favor of developing 
countries was determined at the second United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conference in 1968. 42  The agreed 
purposes were that such measures must be designed to promote 
industrialization, increase export earnings, and accelerate the rate of 
economic growth in developing countries. 43  Accordingly, the intended 
beneficiary of such trade concessions is the economy of a developing 
country and not any private enterprise or outside government. The Enabling 
Clause is a special measure designed to assist very poor countries under 
extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge 
upon whom its benefits should fall. We can thus assert that the profits44 
from the Enabling Clause were intended solely to benefit the people and 
overall society of developing countries via an improved economy and not 
any outside interests.  
For example, the European Union (EU) has a system of tariff 
preferences which allow certain developing countries to import goods into 
the EU on a duty-free, quota-free basis, to aid development.45  
                                                                                                                 
RESULT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), ART. I:1, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).  
 39. Decision of the Signatories, Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, cl. 3(a), L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979) GATT B.I.S.D. (26th 
Supp.) at 191–92 (1980), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf. 
 40. Work on Special and Differential Provisions, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2010). 
 41. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 163, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). 
 42. About GSP, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (2002), 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1. 
 43. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., THE HISTORY OF UNCTAD 1964–1984 at 58–59, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/286 (1985). 
 44. This is not referring to the general economic benefits such as increased employment, but 
with the further financial benefits namely the monetary profits. 
 45. Council Regulation 732/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 2 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:211:0001:0039:EN:PDF. 
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B. Purpose for Exemptions of Developing Countries 
from Environmental Obligations and BTAs 
Developing countries are sometimes exempted from environmental 
obligations in order to enable them to focus upon their own development 
needs in the short term, despite the pressing need for compliance with 
environmental objectives. International law permits some such exceptions 
due to the gravity of potential economic and social harm that could be 
imposed by ensuring the poorest developing countries put environmental 
targets above alternative goals such as providing food, water, and medicine. 
WTO Member States whom the UN name as “Least Developed 
Countries”46 can be given more time before they are obliged to meet the 
same obligations as other States. The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 47  permits “Special and Differential Treatment” 
that exempts these countries from obligations on phasing out export 
subsidies and provides further time for certain developing countries (and 
transition economies) to achieve agreed standards.48 The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 49  and Kyoto 
Protocol50 categorize signatories based upon economic development; while 
all parties have responsibilities, only industrialized countries committed to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) measures have emissions-reduction requirements. 
Further, the EU pays particular attention to the capabilities of least 
developed countries and recognizes the principle of “Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities.”51 
The justification for allowing goods exported from developing 
countries to be exempted from border tax adjustments follows from the 
general justification of exempting them from border tariffs. If the standard 
that developing countries must adopt to avoid paying border tax 
adjustments is the use of BAT, this can pose serious problems for these 
                                                                                                                 
 46. “Least Developed Countries” are often those whose GNP per capita is lower than USD 
$1000 per annum. What are the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)?, UNITED NATIONS (June 2004), 
http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/FS20.HTM. 
 47. Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
 48. Id.  
 49. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1994/03/19940321%2004-
56%20AM/Ch_XXVII_07p.pdf. 
 50. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. I, ¶ 
7, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005). 
 51. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading 
System of the Community, at 8, COM (2008) 16 final (Jan. 23, 2008). 
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countries. For those developing countries whose economies are dependent 
upon industrialized countries’ consumption of their exports, the prospect of 
changing their PPMs to BAT may cause concern because of the 
incompatibility of those production methods to their development goals. 
Many developing countries aim for labor-intensive industries rather than 
BAT in order to create employment, and such technology may not only 
create unemployment but may need to be imported from an industrialized 
country at high cost.52 Aside from being allowed to export without border 
tax adjustments, the capital expenditure of the BAT plus technical experts 
(possibly foreigners) to operate and repair the technology and train locals 
on its usage, may serve no economic or social needs for the developing 
country and may hinder other development needs. Further, if the 
environmental problem to be corrected is localized in the industrialized 
country using border tax adjustments, the developing country may see no 
environmental benefits internally from using BAT. 
Imposing environmental requirements, such as BAT with which 
exporting developing countries must comply to avoid the border-tax-
adjustment charge, has thus been referred to as “eco-imperialism.”53 Rather 
than using border tax adjustments to force developing countries to comply 
with environmental obligations, the stance accepted herein is that trade 
concessions, including the exclusion of these adjustments for imports from 
certain developing countries, should be avoided in order to promote 
economic development. The environmental goals, which would ordinarily 
necessitate border tax adjustments, can instead be achieved in developing 
countries via subsidies and assistance from their industrialized partners.54  
C. Limiting the Availability of Trade 
Concessions to Intended Beneficiaries 
Nevertheless, since this means that pollution-intensive imports may be 
able to compete with goods produced using BAT, it is important that: (a) 
such concessions are made only in the short term until a developing country 
develops the capability to produce goods using BAT, via subsidies and 
technical assistance from industrialized countries; and (b) the quantity of 
pollution-intensive imports reflects only the intended beneficiaries. This 
latter point is crucial since an industrialized country’s market could become 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See A GLOBAL PROGRAMME, supra note 27, at 10. 
 53. Mia Shanley & Iona Wissenbach, Germany Calls Carbon Tariffs “Eco-Terrorism,” 
REUTERS, July 24, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56N1RJ20090724. 
 54. Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: The 
Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 289, 291 (2005). 
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saturated with pollution-intensive imports, causing significantly reduced 
demand for goods produced using BAT. This risk exists where there is the 
possibility of the benefit of the trade concessions falling outside of the 
intended beneficiaries—namely into the hands of foreign private enterprise. 
A Multi-National Enterprise (hereinafter, “enterprise”) operating within a 
developing country could utilize its trade concessions to produce pollution-
intensive exports for sale in an industrialized country below the cost of 
BAT-produced goods. Though the developing country’s export earnings 
would be increasing, the profits may leave the developing country and 
mainly benefit shareholders in industrialized countries.  
Prima facie, this would appear not to infringe upon the given purpose of 
non-reciprocal trade concessions. Export earnings could increase in 
developing countries and there may be some employment and economic 
development: however, the practice of enterprises benefiting from such 
trade concessions goes against the spirit of the concessions for two 
fundamental reasons. 
The first reason is that the concessions are designed to benefit the 
economy of a developing country. If profits are leaving the country, then the 
extent of the economic benefit to the developing country is reduced. 
Although jobs may be created and factories may be built, if the full benefits 
went to the intended beneficiaries, then there may be significantly greater 
economic development, with profits being reinvested into the economy and 
the country’s net wealth increasing. In this way, the economy can graduate 
into an industrialized economy, rather than remaining developing. 
Importantly, enterprises should not be discouraged from investing in 
developing countries and creating growth there, but in this special 
circumstance it is crucial that the concessions create as much growth for the 
intended beneficiaries as possible. 
The second reason is that it is inequitable for industrialized countries to 
provide this form of development aid, only for it to benefit private parties 
outside of the intended beneficiary, the developing country. The Enabling 
Clause allows nations to discriminate, where normally they cannot, for the 
purpose of benefiting a developing country’s economy. Therefore, gaining a 
private advantage through this charitable provision is exploitation and can 
prevent the benefit from being utilized by those for whom it was intended. 
Furthermore, the negative impact on an industrialized country’s 
economy could be worsened if, as mentioned, an enterprise has an incentive 
to mass produce pollution-intensive goods, damaging domestic 
manufacturing that only had been prepared to bear a minimal burden to aid 
developing countries. At the same time, the environmental impact caused 
by an enterprise’s expansion of pollution-intensive production in a 
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developing country could be significant, negating any benefit of an 
industrialized country’s internal environmental taxation. 
VII. TOWARDS OVERCOMING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAX LEAKAGE AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT 
CONCESSIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. Intended Beneficiaries 
Having determined the limited parties whom the Enabling Clause was 
intended to benefit, and the inequitable position of allowing outside parties 
to benefit, it is important next to consider the potential for exploitation of 
these rules. Following this explanation, potential solutions to the stated 
problem will be explored. 
B. Exploitation 
A possible exploitation of the rules by corporations is not just leakage, 
but using the Enabling Clause as a loophole—a potential problem which 
remains unexplored. An industrialized counry would intend that the 
existence of border tax adjustments would remove the incentive for an 
enterprise to relocate to another country to take advantage of the latter’s lax 
environmental rules and thereby lower its costs. 55  However, a problem 
arises when the enterprise relocates (in all or part) from an industrialized to 
a developing—or least developed—country that has non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences with that industrialized country. Under such circumstances, 
exports from the developing country may not be subjected to border tax 
adjustments.  
Therefore, an enterprise could produce its pollution-intensive goods in 
a developing country and export them without paying a border tax 
adjustment to an environmentally-stringent industrialized country.56  This 
possibility puts the industrialized country at the potential disadvantage of 
having pollution-intensive goods undercut those goods produced with BAT. 
While the purpose of the Enabling Clause is to provide a form of 
development aid to developing countries, 57  this scenario is an indirect 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 
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 56. Erik Levinson, Offshoring Pollution: Is the United States Increasingly Importing Polluting 
Goods?, 4 REV. ENVT’L ECON. & POL’Y 63, 74–77 (2010) (discussing recent studies suggesting U.S. 
offshoring is creating pollution). 
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subsidy to enterprises who would be benefiting at the expense of both the 
environment, where their negative externalities are not accounted for, and 
environmentally-conscious producers using BAT. In this instance, the 
profits would not be going to the intended beneficiaries in developing 
countries, but to the shareholders of enterprises who may still be based in 
the industrialized country. 
The pressure upon enterprises to exploit the tax system in this manner 
arises from their aim of mitigating costs to maximize profits. Such a cost 
reduction could not only help to reduce costs, but could place pollution-
intensive goods at a cost advantage over goods produced using BAT and 
sold in an industrialized country. Thus, shifting demand towards the 
pollution-intensive goods, increasing sales and providing enterprises with a 
distinct incentive to continue profiting in this tax-avoiding manner. 
1. Examples 
The examples below demonstrate the potential risks, using the 
hypothetical as follows: 
The United Kingdom (UK) introduces an internal 
environmental tax on the production of final and 
intermediary goods. This is coupled with a border tax 
adjustment to represent the amount that imports would 
have been taxed had the import been produced under the 
UK’s environmental production tax. Production using BAT 
is tax-exempt, and imports certifying that they were 
produced using BAT do not have to pay any border tax 
adjustment.  
Y-Co. is a yacht manufacturer based in the UK. 
T-Co. is a producer of final and intermediary goods based 
in Tanzania. 
The UK offers trade concessions to Tanzania, a least 
developed country, in the form of an exemption from any 
border tariffs, including border tax adjustments. In this 
example, Tanzania does not have the capability to produce 
using BAT. 
Intermediary goods and final goods imported to the UK 
must carry a certificate of origin. 
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Example 1 
Y-Co. imports intermediary goods for use in the assembly of yachts 
from T-Co. because they are less expensive than intermediary goods 
produced in the UK.  
Y-Co. then sells its final product in the UK at a cost of £200,000.  
Yacht producers who sourced all of their intermediary goods from those 
producers using BAT sell similar yachts in the UK for £220,000. The extra 
cost reflects the high cost to manufacturers of intermediary goods of 
purchasing and operating BAT. Manufacturers of intermediary goods not 
using BAT, based in the UK or a country without trade concessions with the 
UK, sell goods at a higher price due to the additional tax charged upon the 
non-use of BAT. Producers sourcing goods from such manufacturers sell 
similar yachts in the UK for £250,000. Consequently, Y-Co. has the 
advantage because it purchases intermediary goods from Tanzania.  
In this example, although Y-Co. is benefiting from the tax model at the 
expense of the environment, this will not infringe upon the purposes of the 
Enabling Clause if T-Co.’s profits remain in Tanzania. 
Since the final good is assembled in the UK, whether there is a charge 
to environmental production tax will depend upon whether it is assembled 
using BAT. In this way, the only goods produced without BAT and not 
attracting the tax, are those produced in Tanzania, and the main purpose 
should be to benefit the Tanzanian economy. 
Example 2 
T-Co. exports its own final products to a buyer in the UK, who sells the 
yachts in the UK for a profit. 
Given that T-Co.’s profits remain in Tanzania, there is no infringement 
of the Enabling Clause, and the purpose is fulfilled because exports rise and 
the Tanzanian economy benefits. 
Example 3 
Y-Co. moves its manufacturing process from the UK to its subsidiary 
company, Z-Co., in Tanzania. Z-Co. produces yachts in Tanzania and 
exports them back to the UK for sale. Z-Co. can then sell yachts in the UK 
below the cost of yachts produced using BAT. Profits of the sale are 
transferred from Z-Co. to Y-Co.  
Although this does not breach the letter of the law, it goes against the 
purpose of the Enabling Clause. Since Y-Co. retains the profits in the UK, 
there is insufficient economic benefit for Tanzania to justify the concession 
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from the UK’s perspective. This is further the case when the profits are not 
returned to the UK but to a competitor industrialized country. 
Furthermore, since the manufacturing has taken place in Tanzania and 
not the UK, not only has the UK lost employment and tax revenue, but it 
has lost the ability to regulate the environmental externalities caused during 
manufacturing.  
Example 4 
Y-Co. acquires T-Co. Y-Co. produces all of its intermediary goods in 
the UK without using BAT and is charged an environmental production tax. 
However, upon export, this tax is remitted to Y-Co. as a border tax 
adjustment. Y-Co. exports the intermediary parts to T-Co. for assembly. 
Within Tanzania, there is minimal assembly required. Y-Co. then imports 
the final product from T-Co. for sale in the UK. 
In this situation, which goes against the spirit of the concessions of the 
Enabling Clause, origin requirements would prevent the concession being 
granted upon the yacht’s import into the UK. Origin requirements mean that 
a country benefiting from trade preferences must wholly or substantially 
produce the goods so that they cannot undergo only a small amount of 
processing in such a beneficiary country. 58  Goods must be wholly or 
substantially produced in the beneficiary country for them to achieve the 
border-tax-adjustment exemption, which is reasonable because otherwise 
there would be little benefit to the developing country and only the 
enterprise would benefit.  
The same result would apply if the intermediary goods were 
substantially imported from third-party countries. 
2. Summary of Unintended Beneficiary Problem 
The rules on non-reciprocal trade preferences do not explicitly prohibit 
enterprises from profiting from trade concessions. Indeed, some 
industrialized countries allow enterprises based within their jurisdiction to 
profit from the concessions they make to developing countries.59 However, 
for an industrialized country intending for the benefits of its concessions to 
assist the economy of a developing country to the maximum extent possible, 
without providing benefits to those outside of the developing country, such 
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an industrialized country will need to consider methods to attach to its 
border tax adjustments to prevent any benefit—namely profits—from 
leaving the developing country. The methods discussed below will attempt 
to find a watertight solution to ensure foreign enterprises, particularly 
enterprises, do not exploit the provisions of the Enabling Clause.60 
C. Towards a Solution 
Finding a solution involves first ascertaining what legal capabilities an 
industrialized country has to alter PPMs outside its jurisdiction. A sovereign 
country has the sole right to prohibit a company based within its own 
jurisdiction from producing and selling pollution-intensive goods within 
that jurisdiction. Unilateral actions of an environmentally concerned 
industrialized country can only assert pressure on a developing country, or 
its domestic enterprises, to change internal PPMs. However, a concerned 
industrialized country has much more control over the environmental 
qualities of what it imports. This can be done by ascertaining the origin of 
imported intermediary or final goods in order to determine whether such 
products can be sold within an industrialized country’s jurisdiction.  
A producing company based within a developing country may also be a 
subsidiary of a company based within an industrialized country—or may be 
owned (partly or wholly) by private or corporate shareholders resident in an 
industrialized country. By identifying the ultimate shareholders of such a 
company, the benefiting parties can be determined. Since the purpose of the 
Enabling Clause is for residents of developing countries to benefit for 
development purposes, it is important that shareholders based within 
industrialized countries are not the beneficiaries. This would promote 
leakage.  
To determine whether the appropriate beneficiaries are benefiting, the 
stance will be adopted that non-residents of a developing country should 
not be the main beneficiaries. Therefore, the objective is to ensure that any 
enterprise benefiting from the concession is substantially owned by 
residents of developing countries. This is not a perfect solution because 
there is no guarantee that the wealth will be distributed within that country; 
however, since the wealth remains within the developing country, rather 
than being distributed abroad, it is as far as the objective can go to ensure 
the purposes of the concessions are carried out. 
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Furthermore, while developing-country enterprises are not being 
punished by industrialized countries with tariffs they are unable to afford 
for not using BAT, it is also the case that pollution-intensive capabilities 
within developing countries should not be overly encouraged. Foreign 
investment could encourage pollution-intensive capabilities within 
developing countries, which is why benefits to enterprises are discouraged. 
The idea of the concessions is to allow developing countries to benefit in 
the short term to avoid catastrophic social and economic consequences 
caused by losing export revenue, until such assistance is provided to 
developing countries enabling them to operate using BAT. As such, the 
reasoning is that an industrialized country will allow a developing 
counterpart to compete in their territory using non-BAT PPMs in their 
exports, but will not help them to expand their non-BAT PPM capabilities. 
This limited assistance rationale means that enterprises should not be 
shareholders of non-BAT developing country enterprises claiming the 
border-tax-adjustment concession, should not be involved in such joint 
ventures, and should not provide funding to develop non-BAT PPM 
capabilities. The import of non-BAT produced goods for sale in 
industrialized countries is the appropriate level of assistance to developing 
countries. As such, “substantial” should mean that enterprises within a 
developing country claiming border-tax-adjustment concessions must be 
wholly owned by residents of the developing country and no one else. 
Admittedly, this may prevent occurrences where a small amount of foreign 
assistance could cause a large benefit. Only with such a stringent rule can 
any incentive to exploit the concession be removed (though this is 
examined further when looking at joint ventures at Part VII.J.). Incentives 
should instead be used within industrialized countries to expand BAT 
capabilities within developing countries in order that there remains an 
incentive to invest in these developing nations, but for the right reasons.  
The various solutions are considered below using the following 
assumed terminology relevant to the hypothetical scenarios discussed: 
• Ecoland: an industrialized country with stringent 
environmental regulations or taxation, with border tax 
adjustments on imports unless BAT is used; 
• Developa: a “pollution-haven” developing country with 
non-reciprocal tariff preferences with Ecoland 
amounting to an exemption from BTAs for exports;  
• X-Co.: an enterprise registered in Ecoland with 
customers in Ecoland, intending to relocate parts of its 
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business operations to Developa to produce without 
using BAT and export those goods from Developa for 
sale in Ecoland; and 
• Sub-Co.: a company registered in Developa and not 
using BAT. 
For descriptive purposes, the following solutions will utilize limited 
companies as the chosen business model of an enterprise, other than the 
discussion of joint ventures at Part VII.J. However, the following solutions 
can also be adapted to apply to other forms of business, such as sole traders, 
partnerships, and public limited companies. 
D. Restriction on Relocating Companies 
One option would be to impose a restriction on companies relocating to 
Developa in order that companies relocating from outside Developa would 
not be able to take advantage of border-tax-adjustment concessions with 
Ecoland. However, there is the serious practical problem of how to 
determine whether a company is “relocating.” Companies forming in 
Developa could be either the continuing business of a company relocating 
from Ecoland, or a business entirely formed in Developa without foreign 
interest, or a mixture of both. The complexities of determining whether a 
company in Developa is a relocated company would be highly impractical. 
One means of preventing relocation would be to restrict the concession 
to only existing companies in Developa. However, this could still mean that 
any foreign-owned (or partially owned) companies who were operating in 
Developa prior to this restriction could continue to profit. It would create 
incentives for shareholders to invest in such companies since they would 
have economic advantages over other newly-formed or newly-relocated 
companies. This could prove anti-competitive in Developa’s internal market, 
creating monopolistic corporations who attract much foreign investment. In 
such a scenario, non-developing-country investors could continue to profit 
while the environment might suffer further with large market forces created 
through an existing developing-country company’s export rights. Equally, a 
small number of large producers could sell their products at costs below the 
costs of similar goods in Ecoland, thereby damaging Ecoland’s economy 
and environmental objectives. Therefore, such an option is highly 
impractical. 
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E. Residency and Citizenship Requirements 
An alternative means of closing access to the border-tax-adjustment 
concession to X-Co. is to restrict its use only to companies wholly owned 
by shareholders resident in Developa. It is important that such companies 
could not be subsidiaries of other companies, unless those companies are 
also wholly owned by shareholders resident in Developa. In doing this, 
Ecoland would not put its shareholders at a disadvantage against other 
industrialized countries who could otherwise become shareholders in 
Developa’s companies. 
In order to restrict the concession to the intended beneficiaries, it would 
be necessary to identify whether a Developa company is owned by 
shareholders who are resident, ordinarily resident, or domiciled in Developa 
(assuming that Developa’s tax system has a similar legal meaning of these 
terms as in the UK). With such requirements, the shareholder must have 
established a permanent presence in Developa and be paying tax within that 
jurisdiction. Any foreign national wanting to relocate to take advantage of 
Developa’s trading rights would need to be physically present, reside in 
Developa, and pay tax there. This requirement to relocate, coupled with the 
time requirements and procedural difficulties to gain residency in Developa, 
may sufficiently deter those only seeking to exploit trade privileges.  
A tighter version of this rule would only permit companies with 
shareholders with citizenship in Developa to take advantage of this 
concession. Since citizenship is generally more difficult to gain than a 
residency permit, it is a more certain indication that the beneficiary intends 
to remain in Developa. For example, in the United Republic of Tanzania it 
is not possible to gain dual-citizenship, so an alien would need to renounce 
any previous citizenships,61 have lived there for eight years, speak English 
or Kiswahili, and intend to continue to reside permanently in Tanzania.62 
This would not deter ordinary foreign direct investment into Developa, 
other than investment for the purpose of exploitation of the border-tax-
adjustment concession. Such a provision can be a permissible condition 
following EU Tariff Preferences, which allows the Enabling Clause to be 
designed towards the development needs of a developing country.63 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Tanzania Citizenship Act of 1995, 6, Oct. 10, 1995 (United Republic of Tanzania), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5734.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 62. Id. at 2d sched. § 9(1). 
 63. Appellate Body Report, supra note 41, ¶ 162 (discussing that treatment of “developing 
countries” may be different). Paragraph 168 highlights ¶ 3(c) of the Enabling Clause which requires 
Enabling Clause treatment to be “designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.” Id. ¶ 168.  
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This provision would not enable joint ventures with individuals or 
companies from outside Developa to become a beneficiary of the border-
tax-adjustment concessions. The following solutions are developments of 
this proposed solution. 
F. Corporation Tax 
Another solution is to charge a corporation tax surcharge upon X-Co. 
Since X-Co. is registered in Ecoland, it is possible to tax X-Co.’s foreign 
assets. The surcharge would become chargeable in Ecoland based upon any 
foreign assets of X-Co. that are not produced using BAT. The incentive 
would therefore be for X-Co. to ensure that all of its foreign companies 
within its group would use BAT, since it would otherwise be taxed within 
Ecoland. In order that companies would not be discouraged from remaining 
registered within Ecoland, a parallel corporation tax incentive could be 
offered to companies registered within Ecoland whose foreign assets 
produce using BAT—such as a corporation tax rebate or deferral. 
Therefore, if Sub-Co. was a subsidiary of X-Co., X-Co. would be liable 
for a surcharge since Sub-Co. produces using non-BAT methods. In this 
manner, Ecoland is able to extend its environmental influence outside of its 
borders to encourage improved PPMs and remove the incentive for 
enterprises to exploit trade concessions if they wish to continue having 
access to Ecoland’s market. The result of such a policy is even more far-
reaching. Even if Sub-Co. only produced and sold goods within Developa, 
X-Co. would still be subject to a surcharge because it owns Sub-Co. 
To enable a level playing field for Ecoland’s domestic companies, the 
corporation tax surcharge would not only fall upon X-Co., but it would also 
fall upon any company which imports goods from Sub-Co. if Sub-Co. is 
owned by companies registered outside of Developa. By creating this 
disincentive, a company from Ecoland would not be able to avoid the 
surcharge of goods sold in Ecoland by simply registering a company in a 
different industrialized country and then acquiring Sub-Co. from there. 
Instead, the chargeable transaction takes place in the UK so that there is no 
leakage of companies leaving Ecoland or simply registering additional 
companies abroad to exploit a new loophole, and companies registered in 
Ecoland would not suffer a competitive disadvantage against companies 
registered in any other country outside of Developa. 
By discouraging the practice through this surcharge, Sub-Co. is then 
only able to benefit from the concession if it is not a subsidiary of a 
company based outside of Developa. Of course, companies operating in 
Developa which do use BAT would not be eligible for any border tax 
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adjustment regardless of their ownership. The advantage would be that any 
company benefiting from the concession would then be a wholly owned 
entity within Developa, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the concession.  
Such a system is not inconceivable, and a similar system exists in the 
UK pursuant to the rules on “Controlled Foreign Companies” (CFCs).64 
CFCs are companies65 that reside outside the UK but are controlled66 by 
persons (defined to include companies, individuals, and trusts) that reside in 
the UK, which are taxed at rates below seventy-five percent 67  of 
corresponding UK taxes.68 When a company that resides in the UK has at 
least a twenty-five percent interest in the CFC, a charge can be made.69 The 
charge is shared between those UK companies with such an interest in 
CFCs (the charge is proportionate to the amount of those companies’ 
interest) where they have used foreign territories’ low-tax systems to reduce 
their liability to tax in the UK.70 The charge is equivalent to the corporation 
tax charge,71 less taxes paid in the foreign territory,72 meaning that there is 
no benefit for a UK company manipulating a foreign country’s low-tax 
advantages to avoid corporation tax, since the UK will charge corporation 
tax in any case.73 Dual-resident companies can also be regarded as being 
resident74 in the UK for the amount attributable to UK resident companies.75 
The overarching purpose of the CFC rules is to prevent multi-national 
companies from avoiding UK tax by diverting profits to companies 
registered in countries where profits would be charged to a lower, more 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, § 747(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter ICTA], available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/part/XVII/chapter/IV/enacted. 
 65. Id. § 832(1)–(2) (defining company as any body, corporated or unincorporated association, 
but not a partnership), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/section/832/enacted. 
 66 Id. § 755(2), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/part/XVII 
/chapter/IV/enacted (defining controlling company). 
 67. Id. § 750 (as amended by Finance Act, 1993, § 119(1) & (2)), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/part/XVII/chapter/IV/enacted. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Connected or associated persons holding shares are also counted when calculating the 
percentage interest. Id. § 747(5) (as amended by Finance Act 1998, § 113 (Eng.)).  
 70. Id. § 703, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/section/703/enacted. 
 71. Id. § 747(4)(a), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/part 
/XVII/chapter/IV/enacted. 
 72. Id. § 750(1A). 
 73. During the drafting of ICTA, the controlled foreign company rules were under review. See 
HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, supra note 18. Section 36 of the Finance Act of 2009 amended ICTA’s 
controlled foreign company rules. Finance Act, 2009, § 36 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/10/contents. 
 74. ICTA § 747(1)(b) (exempting CFCs from the Finance Act of 1994, § 2.249 (Eng.), thus 
preventing dual-resident companies from claiming single residence under a double tax treaty). 
 75. See generally JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 1173–80 (Hart Publishing, 6th ed. 2008) 
(providing an overview of CFCs resident in low tax areas). 
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preferential rate of corporation tax.76 Importantly, this is an anti-avoidance 
provision, meaning that a tax avoidance motive must be established for any 
amount to become payable.77 It is conceded, however, that such clauses 
have sometimes proved difficult to enforce. 
G. Tax on Dividends 
A problem with the above method is that if a company is performing 
badly, it may need to defer payments of taxation or may not pay the full 
amount, so the surcharge would have little actual effect. A solution which is 
potentially more effective may be to charge shareholders income tax, 
instead of charging the company corporation tax. This may be a sufficient 
deterrent to prevent the company from exploitative practices in the first 
place. 
Resident shareholders within Ecoland could be charged a tax on 
dividends paid out from resident or non-resident companies not using BAT. 
This would apply the same rules to both parties and, therefore, be non-
discriminatory. The rules could also apply to resident shareholders in 
resident companies with subsidiary non-resident companies (or as part of a 
group), so as to include any foreign holdings. Resident shareholders would 
then lose the incentive to invest in X-Co., and companies would be deterred 
from not using BAT in either their own company, their subsidiary, or group 
companies. 
The purpose of this proposed tax on shareholder dividends is that the 
buck stops with the shareholder. Companies in Ecoland may be able to 
benefit from exploiting developing-country concessions, but their 
shareholders would inevitably lose out by having their shareholder 
dividends charged to a higher level of tax than if their company was not 
involved in this practice. Consequently, the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
exploitation would be negatively affected, putting pressure on the company 
to change its practices. Profits gained by the company through exploitation 
would also be cancelled out if the company’s share price fell as a result of 
the negative implications for shareholders—the company would lose value 
overall.  
To enable a level playing field for Ecoland’s resident shareholders and 
resident companies, against those residing in other industrialized countries, 
                                                                                                                 
 76. International - Controlled Foreign Companies, HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/international/technical4.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2010). 
 77. ICTA § 747(1). See also INTM208010 - Controlled Foreign Companies: Exemptions - The 
Motive Test, HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM208010.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2010). 
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shareholders of any company importing goods from Sub-Co. would be 
charged to the shareholder income tax, if Sub-Co. is owned by a company 
outside of Developa. Therefore, companies in both Ecoland and other like 
countries would be affected. Such a tax would prevent companies 
registering in other industrialized countries from avoiding the shareholder 
tax and would serve to prevent Ecoland’s shareholders from being put at a 
disadvantage against companies registered in other industrialized countries 
who sell in Ecoland. The rationale is to create a situation where only 
companies resident in Developa, with shareholders resident in Developa, 
could export goods that have not been produced using BAT to Ecoland 
without being subject to border tax adjustments. 
This would have the further advantage of not losing entire holding 
companies to DCs or other ICs offering a less-strict regime. In the UK, the 
controlled-foreign-company rules (see Part VII.F.) do not apply when the 
profits that would be charged are those of an individual (since individuals 
are not companies),78 but individuals that ordinarily reside in the UK are 
instead similarly charged pursuant to the anti-avoidance provisions relating 
to the transfer of assets abroad.79  
A possible risk of discouraging such shareholding, however, is that 
shareholders in industrialized countries may sell their shares to residents of 
Developa in order to avoid the surcharge and receive separate payments 
from the buyers—thereby, ultimately benefiting residents of the 
industrialized country. 
A further loophole remains. If Sub-Co. was wholly owned by 
shareholders within Developa, it is still possible that it could be a parallel 
company of a company outside of Developa. This loophole would allow 
companies in Ecoland or other industrialized countries to import goods 
from Sub-Co., but still benefit. For example, if shareholders in Sub-Co. 
were associated with X-Co., such as if they were employees of X-Co. or 
were otherwise related to employees or shareholders of X-Co., then the risk 
is that Sub-Co. again would become a tax avoidance mechanism. For 
example, Sub-Co. could offer goods to X-Co. at prices below the market 
rate and make no profit itself. General anti-avoidance provisions would be 
needed to close these loopholes, looking at whether Sub-Co. or its 
employees or shareholders were associated with counterparts in X-Co. 
Companies importing goods from Sub-Co., under circumstances where 
                                                                                                                 
 78. ICTA § 747(4)(b), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/ 
section/747/enacted. 
 79.  Id. § 739, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/section/739/enacted. 
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Sub-Co. is associated with the importing company, would then be liable to 
the shareholder income tax. 
H. Type of Taxation 
For Ecoland’s individual shareholders, the charge could then be either 
the loss of any previously available credit on their current tax liability in 
respect of the dividend or a surcharge above the higher rate on top of the 
existing dividend tax. If applied in the UK, this could prove costly to 
shareholders, which could provide the necessary incentive for their 
companies.80  
For Ecoland resident corporate shareholders, the dividend distribution 
could become liable to corporation tax or charged at a higher rate.81 Such an 
amendment would associate the loss of tax privileges with environmental 
negativities, removing the incentive to exploit Developa’s border-tax-
adjustment rights, while providing a strong incentive to use BAT elsewhere. 
I. Conditionality 
The attachment of non-trade conditions to trade preferences for 
developing countries is a legitimate practice under certain circumstances.82 
For instance, a condition may be that a developing country may not import 
munitions or may have to improve its human rights record. The prohibition 
of certain conditions aims to prevent industrialized countries from imposing 
unreasonable policies within a developing country in exchange for trade 
preferences.83 
A condition of granting such preferences could be that any company 
whose shareholders (or holding company’s shareholders) are non-residents 
must utilize approved PPMs (such as BAT) in order to qualify for the 
border-tax-adjustment concession. This would have a similar effect as the 
residency and citizenship requirements discussed at Part VII.E., but would 
provide the developing country with both the autonomy and responsibility 
of determining who ought to qualify. This country would be aware that, 
should this be applied incorrectly, the benefits may be removed altogether. 
This scheme would also improve the administrative ease because 
information on shareholders and residents would be more readily available 
                                                                                                                 
 80. In the UK that charge is outlined by the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act, 2005, 
ch. 3 (Eng.). 
 81. In the UK, such a distribution is not currently taxed. ICTA § 208. 
 82. Appellate Body Report, supra note 41.  
 83. Switzer, supra note 15, at 42. 
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to authorities within the developing country. The problem with this proposal, 
however, is that it burdens the developing country with the cost and 
administration of dealing with this issue—though the increased level of 
autonomy and the consequential creation of government employment could 
make this burden worthwhile. 
J. Joint Ventures 
The examples above do not give express consideration to the 
workability of similar limitation rules where one joint venture company is 
registered in Developa and its co-joint venture company is registered in 
Ecoland. Despite the desirability of situations described above, where 
companies outside of Developa are entirely unable to benefit, it may be the 
case that companies registered in Developa simply do not have the capacity 
to operate in such a way where they can make the most of the concessions 
being offered. Resources, know-how, and capital may be required from 
outside of Developa in order for its citizens to prosper from exporting 
goods at all.  
Such a situation would seem to call for a dilution of the strict 
requirements that limit profits to only Developa’s residents. However, the 
policymaker may still decide not to pursue this. Essentially, the primary 
options available to a policymaker would be as follows. 
1. Allow the Joint Venture to Proceed 
The purpose of this would be to encourage the development of relevant 
business opportunities in Developa and increase exports. However, the risks 
highlighted in Part VII.B. would still apply. Specifically, enterprises could 
exploit the joint venture. The company registered in Ecoland could profit at 
the expense of Developa’s residents. 
2. Allow the Joint Venture to Proceed, 
Limiting the Profits That Can Leave Developa 
This allowance would enable the projects in Developa to begin, and 
help the company registered in Developa to make a profit, alongside other 
economic benefits in Developa. The policymaker would need to determine 
the level of profits permitted to leave Developa while profits can still be 
made. If the level is set too high, then it will be regarded as exploitative and 
limit the benefits available to Developa residents. If the level is set too low, 
then there will be too little incentive for outside companies to invest in such 
joint ventures, and certain projects may not take place. 
178 VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 12 
3. Allow the Joint Venture to Proceed, on the Condition That the Company 
Registered in Ecoland Provides the Necessary Long-Term Expenditure to 
Replace PPMs with More Environmentally Efficient Methods 
The provision of a long-term business plan to replace the PPMs of the 
company operating in Developa with improved methods could provide a 
suitable balance. It would recognize the requirements of the policymaker in 
demanding a higher onus on companies registered outside of Developa, 
who would subsequently profit from such a system, than companies wholly 
owned by Developa’s residents. It would also enable projects to begin that 
otherwise may not be able to without the necessary investment or resources. 
Yet, crucially, it would ensure that the key purpose in allowing such joint 
ventures would be to provide more environmentally efficient PPMs to 
developing countries in the long term, and, coupled with the improved 
economic benefits to Developa, this could prove more beneficial to both 
environmental and economic objectives than not permitting joint ventures 
whatsoever.  
While some policymakers may demand that the improved technology 
must be BAT, it may be more appropriate to demand instead that the 
replaced technology is of a different standard. The rationale for doing this 
would be that technology that is both cleaner and more appropriate to the 
labor-intensive requirements of Developa would be adopted, rather than 
simply technology that is cleaner. In this manner, both the environmental 
and economic objectives can be reached. 
A more restrictive version could also incorporate terms in Part VII.J.3 
above. 
4. Prohibit a Company from Avoiding Payment of BAT if It Is in a Joint 
Venture with a Company Outside of Developa 
This would provide the most administrative efficiency for Ecoland’s tax 
administrators. Further, it would reduce the risk of exploitation and work 
solely for the purposes behind the Enabling Clause, (i.e., preventing 
enterprises from profiting from what ought to be a benevolent provision). 
However, it could be counterproductive if projects in Developa are unable 
to take place whatsoever. 
In summary, the option in Part VII.J.3 would appear the most suitable 
for both the development needs of Developa and the environmental 
objectives of Ecoland. It is anticipated that this will form the basis of future 
research in this area. 
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VIII. REMISSIONS ABUSE 
This final part examines an additional problem related to the export 
element of border tax adjustments, rather than the import element of them, 
and suggests solutions to this problem. When border tax adjustments are 
used to adjust the cost of an imported good, as if it had been taxed in an 
importing country, such as Ecoland, it is common for goods produced in 
Ecoland to also be subjected to a tax adjustment. This can take the form of a 
tax rebate for the domestic environmental tax charged upon production.84 
The export tax remission is permissible under WTO law for final goods, or 
on intermediary goods representing their inputs, given that the remission is 
not greater than the domestic tax charged, since that would constitute an 
export subsidy.85 
The purposes of export remissions are threefold. First, they protect the 
competitiveness of exports against goods produced in countries without 
environmental taxation. If this were not the case, then a competitive 
advantage could be gained by a country without environmental taxation, 
because their goods may be produced and thus sold at lower cost. The 
adjustment means that exports are sold in the importing country as if they 
had been produced in that country. 
The second purpose is to allow an importing country to opt to impose 
its own border tax adjustments, the rationale being that it is the prerogative 
of the importing state to determine its own environmental policy and reflect 
this by setting its own border tariffs. A country with domestic 
environmental taxes would then not be competitively disadvantaged in its 
exports, in the same way that there is no advantage for a country without 
domestic environmental taxes when exporting to a country with them; the 
result is trade neutral. The third purpose is that without such remissions, a 
product could be subjected to double taxation, upon both export and 
import—particularly if both countries have environmental taxation—which 
would prove extremely disadvantageous. 
Exports may be available for remissions regardless of how they are 
produced or it may be dependent upon them having been produced using an 
approved PPM such as BAT. Despite the competitive importance, a problem 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Steve McCorriston & Ian M. Sheldon, Export Competition and the Remission of 
Domestic Environmental Taxes, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 627, 635 (2005) (analyzing the conditions 
under which a tax rebate for domestic environmental tax on production can work). 
 85. GATT, supra note 22, Annex I, art. XVI, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (“[E]xemption of 
an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic 
consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have 
accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”). 
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identified by Johnson is that remitting taxes to all producers regardless of 
their PPM can neutralize any internal incentive for exporting producers to 
produce in a more efficient manner.86 Further, if remissions are available 
regardless of PPMs, then a risk lies in companies taking advantage of the 
export remissions.  
A company could produce an enormous quantity of products in an 
unsustainable manner within Ecoland, though not to be sold within Ecoland, 
since that would attract a non-refundable charge to environmental taxes. 
Upon export, the relevant environmental taxes charged during production 
would be refunded. By causing negative environmental externalities within 
and possibly beyond Ecoland through production, this would fail to serve 
Ecoland’s domestic and possibly international environmental objectives. At 
the same time, the refunded exports could create demand for low-cost, 
high-pollution goods within an importing country with no border tax 
adjustments, even if their own products are subjected to environmental 
policies. It would become a form of pollution subsidy. This environmental 
problem could be localized within Ecoland, meaning that Ecoland would 
suffer the negative externalities while the importing country would be 
benefiting from low-cost imports. 
For example, W-Co. produces in Ecoland but exports its goods. W-Co. 
is taxed based upon its unsustainable PPMs, as one of its intermediary 
goods used in the production of its final good is timber sourced from an 
unsustainable forest within Ecoland. W-Co. sells its final goods to a 
neighboring country that does not charge any border tax adjustment, though 
W-Co. itself has a rule requiring that all timber used in its internal 
production must be sourced from sustainable forests. When W-Co. exports 
its final product, it is refunded the tax it was charged during production, and 
makes a profit by being able to undercut similar goods in the importing 
country. Ecoland, however, is left without a forest. This simplistic 
explanation exemplifies the potential of unaccounted environmental 
damage, where the polluter does not pay. 
One solution is only to allow refunds on goods produced internally 
using BAT, in order to promote its use even for exported goods. Yet, if the 
requirement for exemption of border tax adjustment on imports is the use of 
BAT, then it is likely that this would reflect internal exemptions; 
domestically produced goods could already have tax incentives (possibly 
tax exemptions) for using BAT. Therefore, there would be no refund. The 
problem of losing competitiveness would remain. 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Kenneth C. Johnson, Refunded Emission Taxes: A Resolution to the Cap-Versus-Tax 
Dilemma for Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 3115, 3117 (2007). 
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However, the removal of export refunds would prove disadvantageous 
because it would put internally-produced exports at a competitive 
disadvantage against goods produced in pollution havens and remove the 
extent to which Ecoland could influence a pollution haven to introduce 
environmental policies in order to put their goods on an equal footing with 
Ecoland’s BAT-produced goods.87 
Rather than remove the remissions entirely, one option would be to 
increase the use of “tax occultes” 88  domestically, which could not be 
refunded. 89  However, the counter-effect may be that international 
competitiveness of national industry is reduced, since costs of production 
would rise. Imports from countries not using “tax occultes” to the same 
extent would again become less expensive, since no border tax adjustment 
would apply to account for this. 
A more feasible suggestion is simply to keep the rate of remissions 
low.90 Exporters would not be given full refunds for their taxes through 
production, but a partial refund would assist them in competing overseas. 
The competitiveness of exporting sectors not using BAT would only be 
partially reduced, though reduced to a sufficient extent to encourage the 
switch to BAT. Exporters not using BAT could not exploit the availability of 
remissions if it was sufficiently costly to produce goods without BAT, while 
exporters using BAT could continue to benefit from not being subjected to 
environmentally damaging production tax in the first place. If this was tied 
in with incentives to switch to BAT PPMs domestically, such as an 
exemption on the relevant PPM taxes and capital expenditure allowances, it 
could create the incentive for producers to switch their PPMs to BAT, rather 
than continue producing without BAT.  
Overall, an innovative low-pollution economy in Ecoland could evolve 
due to the incentive to change domestic production methods to BAT for 
both internally-consumed and exported goods. 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Ismer and Neuhoff consider how border tax adjustments can be utilized as a persuasive tool 
to encourage non-participants in international environmental treaties to ratify them. Ismer & Neuhoff, 
supra note 15, at 141. 
 88. Literally meaning “hidden taxes,” “tax occultes” refers to taxes on goods or services which 
partially input into a product, but could only be included by averaging the extent to which a range of 
such taxes proportionately contributes to the total taxes on a final product. See James A. McNamara, Tax 
Adjustments in International Trade: The Border Tax Dispute, 3 J. MAR. L. & COM. 339, 345 (1972) 
(discussing “tax occultes” within the India cascade tax systems). 
 89. Border tax adjustments are not normally applied to “tax occultes” which are defined to 
include “consumption taxes on capital equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in the 
transportation and production of other taxable goods.” GATT Working Party, supra note 13, ¶ 15(a). Nor 
are they thought to be made for payroll or social security taxes. Id. ¶ 14. Nor are they ad valorem taxes 
such as stamp duty, property taxes or registration taxes. Id. ¶ 15(b). 
 90. Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 145. 
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CONCLUSION 
A “leakage loophole” exists where industrialized countries offer 
concessions to imports from developing countries in the form of 
exemptions from border tariffs, including exemptions from border tax 
adjustments for goods produced using methods falling short of production 
methods expected in the importing industrialized countries. Enterprises may 
deliberately base themselves in such a developing country in order to access 
the right to export pollution-intensive goods to an industrialized country 
without paying border tax adjustments, even though the intended 
beneficiaries of the concession were residents of the producing country. The 
system of identifying the intended beneficiaries is imperfect, but it remains 
clear that the benefit should assist the economy of developing countries in 
need of economic assistance and not enterprises whose profits may not be 
recycled back into the developing country.  
A dividend tax on shareholders can provide the most appropriate 
incentive for companies based outside of a developing country to avoid 
breaching any “leakage loophole.” Those companies using BAT, who would 
be able to utilize the Enabling Clause to avoid BAT adjustments at an 
importing country utilizing such a system, would be restricted to companies 
regarded as intended beneficiaries. Those companies could not be owned 
outside of that country, which would severely limit the applicability of the 
concessions but also provide it to only those for whom it was intended. 
Foreign investment going into the country would then be for legitimate 
development purposes and not to exploit their status as a developing 
country.  
It may, however, be necessary to permit a small proportion of 
shareholders outside of a developing country to partially own a benefiting 
company—perhaps ten percent—in order to allow enough inward 
investment to enable companies to start up. However, this could 
unnecessarily complicate the administrative burden and could send the 
wrong signal if it is deemed that the environmental objective in question is 
such that there ought to be no encouragement for an enterprise that could 
hinder its applicability. In practice, whether there will be some or no foreign 
ownership will be dependent upon the environmental objective itself on a 
case-by-case basis, and particularly, whether it is a localized matter or not. 
If the environmental objective is localized in the country introducing border 
tax adjustments to prevent it, then this reduces the justification for 
hindering development in developing countries, but the facts will justify the 
appropriate action. 
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Further exploration is also intended for rules governing joint ventures, 
where companies from outside the developing country would be able to 
profit from the concession, given that PPMs are improved in their co-joint 
venture operating in a developing country in the long term. This could 
provide the incentive for foreign investment to get projects enabling exports 
from developing countries to get off the ground, but also ensure that such 
joint ventures work to transfer knowledge and capabilities from a joint 
venture company in an industrialized country to its counterpart in a 
developing country. This can be done by enabling such joint ventures on the 
basis that more efficient PPMs are implemented in the long term, in order to 
match the environmental efficiencies offered by BAT. However, rather than 
requiring BAT, technology could be developed which is both 
environmentally efficient and capable of providing employment in a 
developing country with high unemployment. This would provide both 
employment and meet environmental objectives—though possibly not to 
the same extent as BAT can. The long-term advances in PPMs could then 
meet the requirements of similar BAT PPMs, enabling the joint ventures to 
operate without needing the concessions.  
One concern for countries considering introducing internal taxation on 
shareholders or enterprises is that there may be a migration to other 
industrialized countries not introducing such rules, which would permit 
them to continue holding subsidiaries in developing countries, and thus 
enable them to continue the “leakage loophole.” However, since such 
migration would reduce their access to their original market, whether this 
risk is appropriate to introduce in a country is dependent upon the strength 
of their market and how appealing it is for companies to be able to trade 
there. If a country introduces these rules, they could make it more attractive 
to operate there by offering tax incentives for companies using BAT. For 
instance, border-tax-adjustment revenue could be recycled by offering 
reduced corporation tax for companies using BAT. If, however, the market 
is not of sufficient attractiveness to retain companies and shareholders, a 
residents-only provision would likely be the more appropriate solution.  
Overall, the fact that such risks can be mitigated should be of comfort 
to countries wishing to introduce internal environmental taxes, which 
should therefore help countries achieve domestic and international 
environmental objectives. 
